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1. Introduction 
The very idea of democracy from its infancy to present day form has been predicated on 
the idea that citizens – in response to varying economic, social, and indeed, even political 
conditions – have a measurable impact in how their nation is governed.  This ideal – to which 
politicians give countless platitudes and political scientists devote entire lifetimes to studying – is 
perceived to be a fundamental aspect of the political process in the United States.  Since this 
country’s founding, elections have been the means to an end – a process that, while certainly 
imperfect, has allowed this representative democracy to flourish and has shed light on its 
citizens’ desires.  Elections’ importance, and the sheer transformative change of which they are 
instrumental in producing, have made this process a point of inquiry for politicians and political 
scientists alike. 
Discussions regarding elections often entail opposing points of view – indeed, arguments, 
by their very nature, are the essence of political science.  However, when educated individuals 
happen to discuss electoral dynamics, they are often faced with two separate issues – what 
motivates voters during election cycles and how one can predict voting behavior with even 
remote accuracy.  Such discussions have been in the academic discourse for over forty years.  
Namely, the work of Kramer 1971 has sparked a flurry of activity in this field, with the express 
purpose of identifying voters’ key motivations and preferences.  The question of “why people 
vote the way they do” has been a key driver in American politics – each piece of research has 
produced works with differing stances on this issue.   
(1.1) The Importance of Broad Voter Choice 
 The importance of broader voter choice must be further underscored.  The understanding 
of voting patterns in the United States is dependent on a thorough understanding of voters’ 
 6
motivations.  Countless studies – many of which will be further elaborated upon in this analysis 
– have been performed to illustrate voter motivations in response to particular stimuli.  However, 
a regional approach to variations in voter preferences has been remarkably absent from literature.  
Indeed, a regional approach to such an analysis could perhaps elucidate significant geographic 
variations in response to stimuli across the United States.  It can be postulated that, to a certain 
extent, one could find substantial differences in the relationship between specific indicators – 
various measurements of changing economic conditions, for example – and electoral outcomes 
between regions in the United States.  This is to essentially infer that there are regional factors at 
work either stabilizing or polarizing the degree of relatedness between independent indicators 
and electoral outcomes. 
 This study is an exercise in studying one of many drivers of voter choice – economics.  
This is a topic that has been qualitatively studied for over 70 years, but since the early 1970s has 
become a more quantitative pursuit.  As discussed later in Chapter 2, this study aims to build on 
the work of Gerald H. Kramer’s major work of 1971 – a model that successfully linked 
economics and voter choice in elections.  By demonstrating that – in an analysis of per capita 
personal income, consumer cost-of-living, real income, and unemployment – per capita income 
has a statistically significant relationship to election returns, Kramer was able to provide an 
initial foundation to study the linkage between economics and politics.  A more rigorous 
explanation of the fundamentals of Kramer’s model is presented in Chapters 2 and 4. 
 (1.2) The Importance of Economics 
 Broad voter motivation can be analyzed from several different perspectives – economic, 
party-affiliation, or even social.  The breadth and depth of potential analysis is virtually limitless, 
which is one of the reasons why this topic fascinates so many in the political science field.  
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However, the breadth of this topic makes it imperative that those performing quantitative 
analyses explicitly limit their work to specific realms.  The purpose of this study is to elucidate 
the relationship between economic indicators and political outcomes on a local basis.  While 
there are several other modifications that can be made to this fundamental line of inquiry – such 
as the inclusion of other potential political variables, like party affiliation – the scope and limit of 
this study is solely how economic changes on a local level fundamentally affect voter behavior.   
 The many alterations that can be made to this study are infinite, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 2.  The ability to vary not only the universe of study, but also the fusion of both 
economic and political factors makes this topic fascinating.  For example, as discussed in 
Chapter 2, Pollard et al add several political variables to the model presented in Kramer 1971.  
This change in scope presents an entirely new field to study – entirely new relationships that can 
be explored.  Such a methodology is intriguing, but must be limited for the purpose of this study.  
The sheer number of different permutations and variations to modeling that can be performed 
make it imperative to explicitly declare the sole factors that will be studied – this study examines 
how economic factors relate to election returns, or voter behavior.    
 Moreover, the fundamental question of economics as a driver of electoral results is also 
of paramount importance in the context of this study.  As discussed in Chapter 2, there is a 
tremendous amount of literature examining the relationship between the economy and voter 
behavior.  In virtually all studies, some basic level of correlation between these two factors has 
been found – the economic metrics with the highest correlation to voter behavior are still very 
much debatable, but a general relationship is present in literature as discussed in Chapter 2. 
 On a purely qualitative level, a relationship between the state of the economy – either 
local or national – and voter behavior makes some intuitive sense.  From an incumbent’s point of 
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view, an economy in a generally “poor” condition can be a relative disadvantage.  Voters feel 
some sense of dissatisfaction with the state of the economy – even as a proxy for the state of the 
nation – and vote based on this perceived unhappiness.  It is important to note that this is a 
general dogma; as previously stated, voter behavior is multifaceted.  There are a number of 
issues that contribute to why voters vote the way that they do.  However, the study of the 
relationship between economic conditions and voter behavior in a more quantitative context – 
which will be further explained in Chapter 4 – can provide some insight. 
(1.3) Regional Differences in Correlation 
One of the elemental aspects overlooked by many political scientists performing broad 
national research is that not all regions of the United States are equal.  There are key 
demographic, economic, and social differences among the many regions in this country.  
Therefore, it is particularly insensitive to this fact to simply aggregate, analyze, and present all 
regions – particularly, all voters – in the country as patently identical for the purpose of a 
quantitative analysis.  Such a broad-level of analysis ignores particulate variations across the 
United States and serves to bury subtleties that could potentially provide significant insights. 
Perhaps a more thorough look at even one isolated region in the context of the broader 
United States can be instructive.  Indeed, one region that has a particularly rich history and wide 
array of diversity – demographic and economic – is the Midwest, also defined as the West North 
Central Midwest by the United States Census Bureau.  This region encompasses the states of 
Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota and is 
emblematic of the key differences among regions throughout the United States.  Historically, the 
Midwest has been a key region of support for both parties in the United States’ two-party system.  
While during the 1960s through the 1980s, this region experienced significant population loss 
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and high unemployment – both of which have since stabilized.  Recently, this region has actually 
trailed other areas of the country in unemployment, as well.  Clearly there are several 
distinguishing factors – demographic and economic – that separate this region from others in the 
United States.  The particular cultural, demographic, and economic facets of the West North 
Central Midwest can possibly have varying electoral impacts when compared with other regions 
of the United States.  
Certainly, the previous discussion regarding the West North Central Midwest region 
further underscores the argument that not all regions should be treated identically via national-
level analysis.  For example, several unemployment indicators – such as the seasonally 
unadjusted historical unemployment rate – vary considerably across regions as demonstrated in 
Figure 1.1: 
Figure 1.1: Historical Unemployment Rate by Region
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In Figure 1.1, it is clear that some regions have significantly lower historical unemployment rates 
– the West North Central Midwest, included.   
If analysis was performed on a strictly national level, this context would perhaps be lost.  
Only through a regional parsing is one able to fully analyze the marked differences in 
unemployment across all regions of the United States.  Indeed, there are marked regional 
differences among demographic, economic, and social indicators – these differences can best be 
resolved utilizing a form of local analysis which will be discussed in greater detail in Chapter 2.  
Such an observation begets the question of a regional difference – that is, is there a 
difference in how economically motivated individuals vote by region?  Do the mechanisms that 
Kramer presents (and that are fully explained in Chapters 2 and 4) actually work the same across 
the United States?  This study seeks to further examine this topic.  However, certain a priori 
expectations can be defined.  The reasoning behind why Kramer’s defined mechanisms could in 
fact demonstrate a regional bias lies in the fundamentals of each region that have not thus far 
been considered in analysis – namely, that the demographic, economic, and social differences 
that exist in regions have some level of combinative effect on how an economically motivated 
voter acts.  It is clear that there are fundamental differences across regions of the United States.  
Intuition would dictate that these differences can – and perhaps, should – have some level of 
impact on the relationship between economic factors as perceived by a voter, and his or her 
electoral reaction to such factors. 
However, contrarian arguments to the aforementioned expected results can just as easily 
be argued.  Many researchers could easily argue that numerous factors, including the universe of 
data studied or indicators used simply would not be enough to parse out such a relationship.  
Similarly, it could be that differences across regions are simply too small to be measured with 
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any sense of accuracy – that is, there is not enough of a difference to demonstrate a statistically 
significant variation across regions.  Regardless of such contrarian assertions, the expectations of 
this study are that the inherent regional differences that exist throughout the United States well 
affect the relationship between economic indicators and voter action to some degree. 
(1.4) Study Goals and Novel Treatments 
 As initially stated, this study clearly does not seek to fully elucidate the rationale of 
voters nor does it fully seek to completely explain the electoral dynamics of any region.  Indeed, 
a thorough examination of individual-level voter behaviors will not specifically be performed.  
An individual-level analysis of voting behavior is out of this study’s scope – it is more related to 
psychological motivators of individuals, rather than furthering an aggregate analysis of macro-
level voting motivators for smaller groups of individuals.  However, it is absolutely clear that 
voting is, at its very core, an individual process – aggregate-level analysis of voters’ behavior 
relies on the assumption that voters must absorb and process some sense of economic conditions 
in their locality and vote based on this analysis.   
Rather, the goal of this study is to shed particular light on the electoral dynamics of 
particular regions as defined by the United States Census Bureau while utilizing a novel 
approach to analysis.  As demonstrated in Chapters 1.1 and 1.4, Kramer’s model is an analysis of 
how national economic conditions affect a political party’s share of the vote in congressional 
elections.  This is a top-down analysis of how broad national economic conditions affect 
electoral outcomes.  This study builds upon such analysis by bringing the scope of study to a 
more local level.  As discussed in Chapters 2 and 4, this study departs from Kramer’s 
methodology by investigating the relationship between economic conditions and electoral 
outcomes on a local level.  From that analysis, a secondary aspect of this study is to investigate 
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regional differences in this correlation throughout the United States.  This method of analysis is 
particularly novel because, as discussed in Chapter 2, there has not been either a localized study 
of the correlation between economic indicators and electoral outcomes nor has there been an 
analysis of geographic variations for such a correlation.  Also particularly unique to this study is 
the fusion of both macro-level, aggregate voting analysis with what is effectively a micro-level 
scale – while aggregate-level economic and voting behavior will be analyzed, it will be done at a 
county-level, in order to test for greater accuracy.  Such an analysis has been chosen as being 
representative of a voter’s perception of his or her “local economy” – how he or she perceives 
the economy on a local scale rather than a national scale. 
After a presentation of existing models and research regarding aggregate-level voting 
models – specifically, those relating economic changes to electoral outcomes – an independent 
model will be presented modeling the correlation between economic indicators and electoral 
outcomes within all regions in the United States.  Indeed, the novelty of this study is rooted in a 
local analysis of economic relationships with electoral outcomes, and determining a regional 
difference in the quantitative relationship between economic indicators and election results.   
(1.5) Analytical Expectations 
 The goal of this study is to effectively evaluate two statements – the degree of correlation 
between local economic changes electoral outcomes on a regional basis and how changing 
economic conditions affect electoral outcomes.  It is first hypothesized that there are regional 
differences in how economic indicators affect electoral outcomes.  There are fundamental 
differences in the demographic, economic, and social aspects to regions in the United States – 
therefore, fundamental differences in how various regions react to changing economic conditions 
should also be seen.   
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 Secondly, the actual electoral outcomes from changing local economic conditions will be 
evaluated.  Because the model that is used for this study incorporates an incumbency weight for 
the party in office during each Presidential election per the methodology presented in Chapter 4, 
it is expected that the incumbent party will suffer losses when average wage is increasing 
(indicating a rise in inflation), per capita income is decreasing, or unemployment is increasing – 
all negative economic conditions.  Indeed, when evaluating three common economic indicators – 
namely, average wage as a proxy for local inflation, per capita income, and unemployment – it is 
hypothesized that several relationships will be determined.  It is expected that when weighted for 
incumbency effects, local inflation and unemployment rates will actually have inverse 
relationships with electoral outcomes.  That is, voters will actively vote against the party in 
power when these two economic indicators are rising.  In contrast, per capita income should hold 
a positive relationship with incumbency-weighted electoral results.  The rationale in literature 
will be presented in Chapter 2.  
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2. Literature Review – Kramer’s Theory and Following Arguments 
 Since Kramer’s influential work in the 1970s, a vast amount of research regarding the 
quantitative analysis of economics as related to political outcomes has been published into the 
public domain – literature ranging in topic from the appropriate level of voter analysis to even 
the validity of historical assumptions.  However, this literature has proven insufficient in 
addressing the key theoretical components of this study – is there a regional variation in how 
voters respond to changing local economic conditions and does this relationship hold true on a 
local level.  The following selection of literature pieces presents the existing lines of inquiry, as 
well as demonstrates the dearth of information regarding these overarching, fundamental 
questions.  Indeed, after a complete analysis it is evident that – while there have been several 
variations to Kramer’s method of aggregate-level, quantitative analysis over the past half century 
– there has been very little attention given to local and regional variations regarding changing 
economic indicators and electoral outcomes.  
(2.1) A Pocketbook Versus Sociotropic Debate 
Literature has been flooded with competing arguments regarding economic changes and 
aggregate voter behavior since Gerald H. Kramer’s seminal work, “Short-Term Fluctuations in 
U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964” in 1971.  Works following Kramer have sought to identify 
links between economic changes and voter behavior, but have been varied in their data and 
scope.  Central to identifying this relationship has been a contentious debate regarding the scope 
of study.  Kramer has argued for a more aggregate-level approach – voters are treated as 
overarching groups whose behaviors can be modeled accurately and empirically (1971).  Kramer 
further cements his stance on an aggregate-level analysis approach by effectively discounting 
virtually all individual-level analysis – that is, analysis performed at the individual voter level, 
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pursuing a more psychological approach to individual voter motivations.  Such an analysis is 
inherently grounded in an individual, psychological level – or a “pocketbook voting” model, in 
which individuals vote based on their perception of their and immediate family’s financial 
health.  The majority of individual-level analysis is performed through panel data and surveys, 
rather than empirical analysis of economic and election data.  Kramer fully concedes that at its 
core, individuals cast votes and aggregate-level analyses – or sociotropic voting patterns, where 
voters vote based on their evaluation of the entire country’s economic situation – is still rooted in 
such a fact (1983).  However, Kramer also readily acknowledges that a precise distinction 
between the pocketbook and sociotropic voting philosophies cannot be fully parsed (1983). 
In sharp contrast, others – including Gregory B. Markus – have argued for a more 
individual, micro-level approach towards modeling a relationship between economic conditions 
and actual voter behavior (1988).  Markus ascribes general voting patterns linked with economic 
conditions to the notion of personal choice and an individual’s perception of economic stability.  
Indeed, the rationale behind Markus’ argument is that individual-level voting patterns cannot be 
fully described through aggregate means – an aggregate result is not necessarily congruent with 
results found at the individual level.  However, Markus also completely concedes severe issues 
with microdata-based models, as well – individuals are generally surveyed by cross-sectional 
means rather than longitudinally, making the study of long-term national economic changes 
especially difficult.   
(2.2) Kramer’s Quantitative, Aggregate Level Approach 
 Kramer’s 1971 work truly proved to be integral to the study of voter behavior and 
motivation – a truly revolutionary piece that changed the paradigm of how political scientists 
viewed economic-motivated voting patterns.  A portion of the transformative impact Kramer’s 
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piece had on the field can be attributed to the existing paradigm of voter analysis in the late 
1960s and early 1970s.  Much of the literature debate from the 1920s to the 1940s was focused 
on empirical, aggregate level analysis of voter behavior – work that is very similar to Kramer’s 
overarching arguments.  However, this empirical analysis was not particularly sophisticated, 
having been based on very flawed assumptions and extreme limitations to practical use (Monroe 
1979).  After nearly two decades of such an analytical framework, quantitative, empirical studies 
were proven too flawed for reasonable, meaningful analysis.  Indeed, the significant limitations 
of such narrow aggregate-level analysis effectively discounted such analysis in literature for an 
entire subsequent decade.  Thus, a new framework of survey-based, individual-level analysis 
followed.  While these methods were similarly not particularly accurate, they became the 
framework for voter analysis in response to economic fluctuations during the 1950s and 60s 
(Monroe 1979).  One of Kramer’s major transformative changes was to break such a crippling 
reliance on survey-based studies of voter behavior – effectively, bringing empirical analysis on 
an aggregate level back as a mainstream philosophy for voter behavior studies.  
 While Kramer’s 1971 work had a revolutionary impact on the study of voter response to 
economic changes, there were significant issues with his analysis that were not fully addressed.  
Perhaps most paramount – and relevant to this study – was Kramer’s failure to address regional 
differences.  Indeed, Kramer and his numerous contemporaries have, for the most part, failed to 
ascribe any sense of regional nuance to their analyses.  Kramer, specifically, focuses on the 
national economy in his analysis – local economic changes are patently discounted (1971).  He 
found that there was a statistically significant correlation between several economic indicators 
and national electoral outcomes – however, he did not find unemployment indicators to be 
consistent with this relationship.  His view on aggregate-level analysis is even more narrowed in 
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subsequent works, when he argues that analysis below a full, national-level aggregate analysis is 
effectively irrelevant (1983).  While very likely furthering his argument against individual-level, 
panel studies, such an adamant opposition to aggregate analysis at a more micro-level discounts 
a substantial area of study. 
 Kramer’s opposition stems largely from issue salience.  Namely, he contends that local-
level issues – or individual-level, as well – are not sufficiently salient for voters to absorb, 
process, and then act on in a rational manner.  Because Kramer’s entire aggregate model is based 
on the assumption that voters are effectively “rational economic-political” beings, there must be 
sufficient salience for voters to rationally act on issues – in this argument, Kramer essentially 
believes that voters rationally factor changing economic conditions into their voting behavior 
when casting their vote (Monroe 1979).  
 Methodologically, Kramer’s 1971 analysis poses several problems as well.  Kramer 
utilizes a fairly simple, yet robust model for his analysis – a model that incorporates incumbency, 
presidential coattail effects, and economic indicators.    
(Equation 2.1)  
y0  0  1T  2  3 R0  R1R1



  4
P0  P1
P0



  5 U0 U1 




 u   v
  
As illustrated in 2.1, Kramer’s model is a regression, incorporating year-over-year economic 
changes in relative terms, as well as statistical controls for random disturbance – in this particular 
model,   represents the incumbency index, Y represents monetary income, P for prices, R for 
real income, and U for unemployment as variables for measurement from election cycle to cycle 
(1971).  Also,   and   control for random disturbance parameters in this equation.  However, 
Kramer’s model relies on change in income only as that which is directly affected by the 
government (Yoon 2006).  Such an assumption is arguably dangerous when evaluating voter 
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behavior, as income directly induced by the government theoretically represents only a small 
portion of the total relative change in income for any given voter during any given election cycle.  
Moreover, Kramer identifies voter behavior through party popularity at a national level for 
congressional races.  While he is also incorporating coattail and incumbency effects per (2.1), he 
does not address anything below this level, suggesting that national economic trends dictate 
political changes at a more local level.  The clear schism in Kramer’s model is the use of 
national economic conditions and national party popularity to model relatively local, 
congressional races.  Arguably, Kramer has not been able to robustly establish a clear, direct 
relationship between economic changes on a local level and similar-level outcomes.   
(2.3) Stigler’s Criticisms – Minor Statistical Changes and Philosophical Debates 
 Indeed, while Kramer’s work certainly had a shaping role in the trajectory of the field of 
empirical voter behavior, his arguments do have several flaws that critics seize.  George J. 
Stigler, one of Kramer’s contemporaries, actually found that national economic effects do not 
exert a statistically significant effect on electoral outcomes.  Analyzing data on roughly the same 
grounds as Kramer – namely, unemployment and real income as economic indicators – Stigler 
finds no statistically significant relationships when he alters Kramer’s statistical methodologies 
(1973).  By omitting the years of World War II – 1944 and 1946 – Stigler demonstrates a non-
statistically significant relationship between economic conditions and elections; Kramer omitted 
1942 and 1944 (Monroe 1979).  Effectively, Stigler demonstrates how even the smallest changes 
could alter Kramer’s findings and lead to a completely different conclusion.   
 Moreover, Stigler’s criticisms are also qualitative rather than quantitative.  Kramer and 
Stigler both touch on the more theoretical aspects of voter behavior – namely, the rationality of 
the average voter.  Kramer argues that a rational economic-political voter can accurately perceive 
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changes in national economic conditions – such as rising unemployment rates – and process this 
information in a manner by which he or she votes differently (1971).  Stigler absolutely 
dismisses such a notion, arguing that such minute economic changes have little salience with 
average voters.  Furthermore, Stigler argues that voters change their voting associations so 
rapidly, utilizing the analogy, “it is foolish to sell one's stock in a corporation simply because 
that corporation has had recent reverses, and it is equally foolish to assume that the political fire 
is always more pleasant than the political frying pan.” (Stigler 1973).  
(2.4) Modeling the Effect of Economic Changes on State Elections 
 In response to criticisms to Kramer and Stigler’s work – many of which this study also 
contends – Walker Pollard attempted to parse national-level analysis into a state-level model.  
While still focusing on electoral outcomes in national elections, Pollard studied state-level 
economic changes in per capita income and inflation between 1952 and 1972 (1978).  However, 
Pollard did not keep his analysis strictly to economic causation on voting outcomes.  Rather, he 
also incorporated the political variables of relative changes in party identification, partisanship, 
and presidential incumbency. 
 Pollard’s findings revealed that political variables actually prove more demonstrative of 
electoral outcomes than economic variables.  The most salient economic variable is inflation, in 
Pollard’s view.  However, this analysis still does not adequately address strictly economic 
changes on electoral dynamics over time – in his attempt to simultaneously analyze economic 
and political variables, Pollard allowed his analysis of the political factors overshadow economic 
indicators.  This resulted in his dismissal of economic changes’ relevancy, which is clearly not 
representative of the overall power of economics on presidential elections.  Regardless of the 
shortfalls in Pollard’s analysis, his study has become a proof-of-concept for utilizing more 
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narrow economic changes in national elections.  Candidate saliency proves greater in presidential 
elections versus congressional or state races.  
(2.5) Modeling Congressional Voting Patterns Related to District-Level Economic Conditions 
 As suggested, perhaps a more relevant analysis can be performed by a through 
comparison of local electoral outcomes against local economic changes.  James E. Piereson 
performed such an analysis while studying voter motivations in gubernatorial elections – while 
his methodology trends towards a more accurate picture of aggregate, but still accurate, analyses, 
it still leaves several unanswered factors.  Piereson, utilizing congressional-level economic and 
electoral data for the 1974 national election cycle – the relative change of economic and electoral 
data from 1972 to 1974 election cycles – actually finds a lack of relationship between district-
level economic conditions and electoral votes (1977).  Perhaps directly related to this finding can 
be the salience of congressional candidates and, therefore, the high incumbency rates found with 
congressional candidates.  Piereson does not find a relationship, but it may be integral factors of 
his study – namely, studying congressional elections, rather than an election with lower 
incumbency rates and higher salience – that actually skew his results.   
(2.6) Party Support Predicated on Economic Stability 
 A goal of this study has been to demonstrate the degree of correlation between economic 
conditions and voter behavior. Prior literature has indicated that there is some level of party bias 
during negative economic conditions.  It has been hypothesized that poorer economic conditions 
tend to benefit Democrats in certain instances.  A leading proponent of such a relationship has 
been Morris Fiorina, who found a marked difference in party support based on varied economic 
indicators.  Importantly, Fiorina’s analysis explicitly brings the idea of retrospective voting to 
light – the notion that voters cast votes based on their analysis of historical economic conditions 
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(1978).  Specifically, voters in this model analyze the historical performance of the economy – 
local or national – compared to a historical benchmark and vote based on the analysis.  This 
theory effectively casts voter support to the incumbent party if a given economy is performing 
well compared to its historical state or against the incumbent party if the opposite is true.  
 Fiorina’s analysis dictates a slightly different approach, however.  He asserts that voters 
also have some perceived identification between party representations – that is, that voters tend 
to favor Democrats on the issues of  “employment, wage levels, and farm policies” and 
“government spending and taxation” for Republicans (Monroe 1979).  While these conclusions 
are still significantly speculative, such a relationship is evident and supported by several other 
studies, including that of Wides and Klorman (Wides 1976, Klorman 1978). 
 However, for the purposes of this study, a more “incumbency-based” approach will be 
taken.  Rather than attempting to confirm a priori expectations and generalizations regarding 
which party benefits from changing economic conditions, this study will weight incumbency into 
its model of analysis.  In a manner trending after Kramer 1971, this will allow this study to 
answer a more useful question – is there a strong correlation between local economic conditions 
and voter motivation.  That is, do individuals vote based on the positive or negative state of their 
local economic conditions.  
(2.7) Conclusions from Literature 
 After a complete evaluation of the literature presented, several conclusions become 
evident.  First, it is absolutely true that Kramer’s 1971 analysis was truly in the field of 
quantitative social science research.  In a stark departure from predecessors, Kramer 
demonstrated – quantitatively – that there was a casual relationship between national economic 
indicators and electoral outcomes in Presidential elections.  However, a more precise question 
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was also answered.  Kramer was able to demonstrate that real personal income held the strongest 
correlation between the percentage share of Republican to Democrat votes in Presidential 
elections (1971).  He was also able to illustrate that unemployment levels – once thought to be 
perhaps one of the most significant drivers of electoral outcomes – to not have a statistically 
significant relationship to election returns (1971).  Indeed, Kramer even noted that prior research 
failed to compare unemployment levels alongside other economic indicators – the relationship 
that was demonstrated between unemployment levels and election outcomes in previous research 
did not likely hold as strong of a relationship as other economic indicators (1971).   
 Subsequent research on this line of inquiry has also proven to be equally valuable.  
Barring the statistical arguments and critiques posed by Stigler, the work of Monroe, Piereson, 
and even Fiorina have attempted to refine Kramer’s analysis – indeed, to make it more based on 
particulate arguments.  Analysis has been performed down to the congressional and state level; 
however, there is truly a dearth of research linking local economic indicators to local results.  
When an election of high issue salience is chosen – namely, Presidential elections – the existing 
body of research still cannot give precise, quantitative predictive arguments regarding what type 
of local economic factors will drive voters.  It is the hope of this research material to help in 
furthering the academic discussion regarding this fundamental question. 
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3. Data and Variables 
(3.1) Kramer’s Model: Data and Variables 
 This study aims to build upon the existing body of knowledge and line of inquiry related 
to Kramer’s 1971 model demonstrating the correlation between economic indicators and 
congressional elections.  As discussed in Chapter 2, subsequent studies have made significant 
alterations to Kramer’s model, changing many aspects of his analysis in order to draw broader 
conclusions regarding voter preferences.  Before the specific changes to metrics that have been 
performed in this study are presented, it is instructive to recapitulate the data and variables 
Kramer 1971 used. 
 Kramer’s dependent variable was the Republican share of the two-party vote in 
congressional elections from 1896 to 1964.  His independent variables were per capita personal 
income, prices (per the consumer cost-of-living index, a metric for inflation), real income 
(deflated monetary income), and unemployment as a fraction of the civilian labor force. 
(3.2) Model Transformation for Local Analysis 
 It is particularly useful to initially summarize all variables and metrics used in this study 
and how Kramer’s model has been transformed for the purpose of a county-level analysis of 
economic indicators related to electoral outcomes.  Whereas Kramer used congressional 
elections by congressional district, this study will use county-level Presidential elections.  For 
this study, the dependent variable is county-level election results and the independent variables 
are county-level average wage (a proxy for local inflation), county-level per capita income, and 
state-level unemployment rates.  This allows for an analysis of how correlated these economic 
metrics (the independent variables) are to the electoral results (dependent variable) – that is, what 
effect do economic indicators have on electoral outcomes. 
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The justification for each of these variable choices is fully explained in Chapter 4.2; 
however, it is instructive to frame this subsequent discussion in this section.  Narrowing the 
scope of study poses inherent problems and involves strategic decisions in order to preserve the 
integrity of analysis.  There are fundamental issues in changing the scope of a relatively robust 
model such as Kramer 1971 – a model that incorporated congressional election results as the 
dependent variable, but national economic metrics as the independent variables.  One of these 
issues is the availability of local data versus national-level data.  National, time-series data is 
readily available; however, county-level data prior to 1990 is relatively difficult to find.  While 
two of the indicators were maintained in a county-level and state-level manner – per capita 
income and seasonally unadjusted unemployment rate – Kramer’s national inflation indicator 
was more problematic.  In order to still incorporate local inflation into this study, county-level 
average wage was used as a proxy for national inflation rates.  Finally, Kramer’s weight for 
incumbency was also ported to this study.   
The changes mentioned in this chapter are only provided as a short summary – a full 
explanation of the changes made to Kramer’s model are presented in Chapter 4.2, along with 
justifications for the strategic decisions made in order to perform a local analysis while 
maintaining the rigor of Kramer’s original model. 
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4. An Aggregate, County-Level Model Linking Economic Indicators to Electoral Outcomes 
(4.1) Kramer’s Model – A More Rigorous View 
 While Kramer’s model was presented in Chapter 2 – particularly Model 2.1 – it is 
necessary to delve deeper into his methodologies on a more mathematical level.  As stated in 
Chapter 2, Kramer’s scope of study is a study of congressional election outcomes in the context 
of changing national economic conditions.  The purpose of this study is to build upon Kramer’s 
1971 model by performing a local, county-level analysis of economic conditions as they 
correlate to electoral outcomes.  The scope of this study is based on county-level results in 
Presidential elections, studying the relationship of these election results with county and state-
level economic indicators.  Because this study is essentially a variation of Kramer’s model, 
certain aspects of his fundamental model are altered.  These changes include altering the scope of 
his economic indicators and election results and changing an economic indicator in response to a 
lack of county-level availability of data.  These changes are fully described in Chapter 4.2. 
Effectively, Kramer created a spectrum of equations to model a national relationship 
between economic indicators – namely, per capita personal income in current dollars for the year 
of election being studied, the consumer cost-of-living index, unemployment as a percentage of 
the civilian labor force all as a function of time (or the year studied) – and one party’s share of 
the two-party vote in congressional elections.  This analysis was performed from the perspective 
of the Republican’s share of the congressional party vote during on-year and midterm 
congressional elections.  Kramer started his analysis only incorporating one variable – per capita 
personal income – and then modeled for linear coefficients.  He then created a subsequent 
equation with another variable added, repeating this process with separate equations for each 
variable.  This allowed Kramer to study the individual and combinative effects of all economic 
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indicators in relation to election results – Kramer was able to identify which statistically 
significant relationships existed between each dependent and independent variable sets. 
Also of interest is Kramer’s treatment of incumbency.  Because he was working with 
national data – effectively only one universe of analysis – he could easily weight his equation 
with an incumbency factor based on the year of election which was positive if the incumbent 
President was a Republican and negative if Democrat.  The ability to incorporate an incumbency 
bias is an important factor in creating a rigorous model; it is an issue that will be addressed in 
this study, but on a county-level basis.  This issue will be further discussed in Chapter 4.  
However, Kramer’s use of “coattail effects” will not be addressed as it was intended to directly 
affect congressional elections – inapplicable to this study, which is an analysis of county-level 
results in Presidential elections. 
(4.2) Methodology  
Kramer’s model provided a quantitative framework from which to evaluate the 
relationship between economics and politics.  For this study, Kramer’s model will be modified to 
evaluate the claim of a regional bias between this economic and electoral relationship utilizing 
local, county-level data.  This study will be performed per the following variables presented in 
Table 4.1: 
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Table 4.1: Regression Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
yt 
Democrat share of Presidential election 
results by county (percentage) 
δ incumbency index (+1 for if previous President is Democrat, -1 if Republican) 
Uo, U-1  
seasonally unadjusted, annual 
unemployment rate by state, as fraction 
of labor force for current and preceding 
year (percentage) 
Wo, W-1  
average wage by county for current and 
preceding year (percentage) 
Io, I-1  
per capita income by county for current 
and preceding year (percentage) 
 
A full equation of the novel model presented in this study is provided in Chapter 4.2.   
However, such an evaluation does not lend itself to a direct comparison using Kramer’s 
model – certain changes must be made.  Kramer’s scope of study is a national level of economic 
indicators.  The major deviation from Kramer’s model occurs in using average wage as a proxy 
for inflation – the justifications for this and other minor deviations are as follows. 
Consistencies 
While there are several inconsistencies between a national model such as that of Kramer 
and a local model that were accounted for, the overall methodology of Kramer’s aggregate 
voting model was preserved.  Three economic indicators – namely, per capita income, 
unemployment rates, and average wage – were found on a county-level basis from the 1980 
Presidential election to the 2000 Presidential election.  This data was then related to the ratio of 
Democratic percentage of the vote to Republican percentage of the vote during Presidential 
elections through ordinary least-squares multiple regression – effectively, multivariate 
regression.  Also, Kramer’s incumbency weight was also used – a +1 value was assigned if the 
previous President originated from the Democratic party and a -1 coefficient assigned if the 
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President in the previous term was a Republican.  This weight will be addressed in greater detail 
– and in a mathematical form – in Chapter 5. 
Choice of Elections 
 In his analysis, Kramer utilized the ratio of Republican share of the electoral vote in 
congressional elections.  For the purpose of this study, Presidential elections were used – the 
percentage share ratio of Democrat to Republican electoral votes on a county-level basis was 
used.  Kramer’s reasoning for using congressional elections was due to a lack of candidate 
salience – he likened a lay-voter’s voting rationale to be that of choosing between two relatively 
no-named candidates.  The vote is then more centered on party affiliation rather than individual 
candidate qualities.  Kramer also analyzes both congressional and Presidential elections in his 
study, incorporating “incumbency affects” and “coattail effects” affecting congressional 
elections.   
 An important consideration that should be noted is the introduction of significant third 
party candidates.  During the 1980 and 1992 elections, there were significant third party 
candidates.  The effects of these as related to the model presented – namely, the effect on the 
dependent variable, Democrat’s share of the Presidential vote – should be considered.  Kramer’s 
model and this study are predicated on the analysis of a two-party vote.  That is, the percentage 
of the county-level vote did one party receive.  While this study has closely trended Kramer’s 
analysis, the issue of independent voting poses a significant deviation.  In a similar election – the 
1912 Presidential election, in which there was a significant third party vote – Kramer actually 
omitted the entire year from analysis.  This was possible as he was working with a dataset that 
extended from 1896 to 1964.  Excluding both the 1980 and 1992 data points for this study is 
simply not possible due to the comparatively small number of Presidential elections that is being 
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analyzed.  The years of analysis that were chosen for this study were based on the availability of 
county-level data – the trade-off between extending analysis prior to 1980 and being forced to 
use not use county-level data is one that was noted.  In this study, omitting two Presidential 
elections out of six total elections studied is simply unacceptable.   
 Moreover, the effect of a third party candidate in 1980 and 1992 elections on this study 
are minimal.  Analysis was performed using the methods discussed in this chapter and also 
substituting the Democrat share of the vote with a “Democrat to Republican election-over-
election percentage change” metric.  There was no significant difference between the results of 
both methods.  The latter method allowed some mitigation of effects caused by the independent 
candidates in 1980 and 1992 – the results of that analysis did not significantly differ from the 
results presented in Chapter 5. 
Incumbency 
 An important aspect of the creation of this regression model is the incorporation of 
incumbency effects.  For example, it is hypothesized that if the President from 1976-1980 is a 
Democrat, the Democratic party will have a significant advantage when entering the 1980 
election.  Similarly, if a President is a Republican running for his second term, his incumbency 
must be incorporated into this model.  This is also an effect that was correctly modeled by 
Kramer 1971. 
 For the purpose of this study, incumbency (δ) will be incorporated from the perspective 
of a Democrat-centric analysis – as the dependent variable is the share of the Presidential vote in 
a given year attained by the Democrat party, a +1 weight will be applied to all variables of that 
year if a Democrat is the “incumbent” per the preceding Presidential term.  For example, from 
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1992-1996 a Democrat was President; therefore, during the 1996 election, all economic 
indicators will be weighted with a +1.  
 Analysis was, in fact, performed without such an incumbency factor initially.  The results 
– both regression coefficients and the predictive capacity of the generated model – were 
completely unrepresentative of actual values and all proved to be statistically insignificant.  
Upon the addition of this incumbency weight, a major realignment of predicted election returns 
with actual historical election results occurred.  The predictive capacity of this model increased 
dramatically, and several economic indicators became statistically significant, as will be 
presented in Chapters 5 and 7.   
Inflation Metric 
Upon even a cursory look at Kramer’s 1971 model, it is quickly evident that several 
methods of his model would not be appropriate – or even possible, given reportable data that 
exists on this subject – on a local level.  Perhaps most difficult of an indicator to port from a 
national level to a county level is the inflation variable.  Federal agencies unfortunately do not 
calculate any version of local inflation metrics, explicitly.  Metrics such as the Consumer Price 
Index and even the historical tally of the price of essential goods are calculated at a national and 
metropolitan-area level, respectively.  Because local inflation metrics do not exist, one was 
created for the purpose of this study.  Simply, average wage for each county in a time-series 
fashion was used as a metric of inflation. 
Average wage was considered a good proxy for inflation – or the consumer cost-of-living 
index (prices), as used in Kramer 1971 – due to literature on the topic.  A strong correlation 
between inflation and average wage has been established by Cukierman and Lippi (1999).  While 
using average wage as a proxy for inflation is not entirely perfect, given that a consumer price 
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index does not exist on a county-level basis, this correlation serves as adequate for the purpose of 
this analysis.   
Figure 4.1: Historical Inflation and Average Wage Rates in the United States
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Indeed, as demonstrated in Figure 4.1, average wage has generally tracked inflation on a national 
level in the United States.  As previously mentioned, average wage as a proxy for inflation is not 
a perfect measure.  However, the availability of data, coupled with the general correlation 
between the two metrics, allows for a fairly representative approximation of inflation on a 
county-level.  It should also be noted that the purpose of the inclusion of Figure 4.1 is simply to 
allow one to visualize this correlation – the analysis performed is on a county-level measurement 
for average wage, which will naturally provide a different correlation than what is presented in 
this figure. 
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Unemployment Metric 
Kramer’s model places a significant emphasis on the change in unemployment rate from 
each year of analysis compared to its immediately preceding year.  Because Kramer’s analysis is 
performed on a national level the national unemployment rate is used.  However, such data was 
not available on a county level.  The greatest depth of historical time-series, county-level 
unemployment data only went as far as 1990.  Moreover, significant effort was placed in finding 
an adequate substitute that would accurately replace the general rationale for using 
unemployment data.  Essentially, this entire line of inquiry proved to be fruitless, with limited 
data on local employment as a function of the total labor force available.  Due to this 
consideration, state-level historical unemployment data was substituted.  While it does not 
service the preferable universe of data, this substitute still maintains the integrity of one of the 
major goals of this study – to perform an analysis using the most finite form of data available to 
simulate a voter’s cognizance of local economic conditions.  It is particularly important to 
consider the results presented in this study in the context of one metric being of a larger universe 
than the otherwise highly granular data for the other two economic indicators.1 
A Discussion on Statistics Methodology 
An average of the given indicator in each county was then performed on a regional basis 
per the Census Bureau’s definitions for regional divisions.  For example, all economic indicators 
from all counties in the West North Central Midwest region, as defined by the United States 
Census Bureau, were averaged.  This data was then transformed into a percentage change – all 
                                                 
1 The robustness of substituting state-level unemployment data in lieu of county-level unemployment data is 
uncertain.  When regression analysis was performed using the limited amount of county-level data – only 1990 
through 2000 – the standard errors of coefficients was exceptionally high.  This was likely because only two true 
data points were being used – the 1992 and 1996 Presidential elections.  Such results made the decision to use a 
state-level unemployment data in order to gain a greater number of data points an obvious decision and resulted in a 
dataset that fits well to the model (see Chapter 7 for a more detailed discussion on the predictive capability of the 
models presented in the Results section and the “fitness” of the data to the various models).  
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data was calculated in percentage change from Presidential election cycle to the subsequent 
cycle.  Finally, these averaged percentage changes for all economic indicators and election 
returns in each region of the United States was then regressed, using multivariate regression. 
It should be recognized that this methodology poses several highly important 
considerations that will significantly affect the results presented in subsequent sections.  Mostly 
importantly, this methodology treats all counties – or in the case of the unemployment rates, 
states as the geographical stratification – as equal.  Effectively, a county with a large population 
is treated equally as a county with a small population.  The rationale behind sacrificing 
significant context into the data being analyzed versus pursuing this methodology was simple – 
the large dataset that was created needed to be aggregated in some fashion.  It was simply 
unreasonable to attempt to perform regressions on each county in a time-series manner.  
Moreover, a goal of this study is to analyze the differences – if any – that exist among various 
geographic regions of the United States in terms of their economic and political relationships.  
This pursuit would be impossible if no aggregation took place.  Essentially, this method of 
aggregation is far from perfect.  However, the benefits in analysis and logistics that were gained 
made such a methodology essential.  Other differences in analysis were solely trivial, logistical 
issues.2 
 (4.3) The Step-Wise Assembly of a Model 
 Prior to the direct construction of the model that was primarily used to evaluate the 
relationship between economic indicators and election returns, it is particularly instructive to 
                                                 
2 While trivial on a statistical level, it should be mentioned that the specific manner of calculation performed in this 
study differs slightly from that of Kramer 1971.  Indeed, the net change of each economic indicator for each election 
cycle compared to the year immediately before it is performed.  However, Kramer fails to convert indicators in his 
model – and even when evaluating the unemployment rate changes – into percentages.  In this study, the percentage 
change specifically is used for these indicators.  The effect of this change on regression analysis has been evaluated 
to be trivial, but does cause some concern when directly comparing Kramer’s model – Equation 2.1 – to that of the 
finial model presented in Equation 4.7. 
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have a discussion regarding the individual aspects of this model compared directly to election 
returns.  One of the key metrics as discussed in Chapter 4.2 for evaluating the affect of inflation 
on voting patterns is the indicator of average wage.  As discussed, this indicator was used in lieu 
of a county-level inflation metric.  However, the direct relationship between election returns and 
average wage should be studied.  As defined in Equation 4.1, a simple linear relationship can be 
attributed to this indicator in relation to electoral returns. 
(Equation 4.1) 
yt   1 Wo W1W1








 o
 
In this equation, Wo represents the average wage on a county-level basis during the election year 
and W-1 represents the average wage in each county in the year immediately preceding the year 
of election.  It should be noted that for all piece-meal assembled equations, an incumbency factor 
of δ was assigned based on the previous term President’s party affiliation.  A +1 was given to a 
Democrat and a -1 weight was given to a Republican Presidential predecessor.   
Similar analysis can be performed independently relating the two other economic 
indicators – unemployment and per capita income – to electoral results.  Using the following 
equations, it is possible to determine the independent effect of both unemployment rates and per 
capita income on the Democrat share of Presidential votes: 
(Equation 4.2) 
yt   1 Uo U1U1



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



 o
 
where Uo represents unemployment during the election year and U-1 represents unemployment 
rates in the year immediately preceding the year of election.  This rate, as mentioned in Chapter 
4.2, is an aggregate of state historical unemployment rates – this is not county-level data.  A 
similar relationship is demonstrated in Equation 4.3:  
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(Equation 4.3) 
yt   1 Io  I1I1








 o
 
with Io representing pre capita income during the election year of study, and I-1 representing per 
capita income in the year that immediately precedes the election year.  The per capita income 
was analyzed on a county level, and then aggregated as discussed in Chapter 4.2. 
 Finally, for ease of comparison in future regressor tables, multivariate, three variable 
equations have also been created as reference.  Equations 4.4, 4.5, and 4.6 provide useful 
combinations of the economic indicators provided above and are as follow: 
(Equation 4.4) 
yt   1 Io  I1I1



  2
Wo W1
W1








 o
 
(Equation 4.5) 
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(Equation 4.6) 
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(4.4) A Novel Model – An Aggregate, County-Level Model Linking Economic Indicators to 
Electoral Outcomes 
The framework for this novel model can be best illustrated in Equation 4.7: 
(Equation 4.7) o
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Equation 4.7 is modeled after the variables in Table 4.1. 
The results presented in Chapter 5 are also consistent with the methodology used by 
Kramer 1971.  Kramer actually performs a regression correlation all variables – and their 
combinative pairs – to election returns.  Essentially, this method involves performing a 
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regression for each of the equations (Equations 4.1-4.7) presented in this section.  Adding 
variables step-wise allows one to fully understand the relationships among all dependent and 
independent variables, including any synergistic effects or relationships that can be 
demonstrated.  This study keeps Kramer’s methodology consistent in this regard, as 
demonstrated through all data tables in Chapter 5.
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5. Results 
(5.1) Presentation of Data 
 One of the key issues of this study – indeed, one of the implicit goals of this investigation 
– has been to address the quantitative relationship between economic indicators and election 
results throughout broad swaths of the United States.  Inherent in this mission is the processing 
of a large dataset.  Therefore, it is particularly instructive to analyze the strength of these 
relationships in a region-by-region manner.  By its very nature, this discussion will be lengthy 
and laden with several tables.  All tables will reference equations presented throughout Chapter 
4, as indicated in each table.   
The initial assertion presented at the beginning of this study was that each region should 
have a variation in correlation between every economic indicator and electoral results.  Every 
region of the United States has a different set of demographics and socioeconomic factors that 
contribute to its voting patterns.  Therefore, a priori dictate that each region should react to 
economic changes in a slightly different manner with some overarching, national trends.  As 
discussed in Chapter 1, this study is primarily focused on the relationship between economic 
indicators and political outcomes – other more qualitative aspects, such as cultural and social 
factors are not necessarily explicitly analyzed.  However, it is reasonable to expect that the 
fundamentally different cultural, economic, and social demographics that comprise each region 
of the United States – and were evaluated in Chapter 1 of this study – would affect this 
economic-political relationship in some regard.    
This is indeed the type of result set that this study has found.  While it is dangerous to 
fully attribute these nuanced statistical differences among economic regression coefficients to 
demographic, economic, or even social justifications, it is important to fully realize the 
 38
differences among regions.  The data presented in this section heeds these cautions, but also 
illustrates correlations that are stronger or weaker depending on the region of study – there is a 
regional variation among the results presented in this section.  The exact causes of these 
differences cannot be fully elucidated at this time, but it is just simply recognized that the 
staggering differences between regions of the United States can and have produced some level of 
correlation variability on a regional basis. 
 An analysis of the broader data presented yields several broad conclusions across all 
regions.  First, it appears that per capita income has the strongest correlation towards 
incumbency-weighted election results in Presidential elections.  While in some instances this 
relationship appears with the wrong coefficient – that is, it appears as an inverse relationship in 
some regions – it is the metric with the lowest standard error, highest coefficients, and passes t-
tests for statistical significance.  In stark contrast, it appears that inflation metrics do not have a 
significant impact on election results.  In virtually all regions, average wage has very small, 
statistically insignificant coefficient values.  However, this metric does generally prove to have 
the correct sign.  Finally, unemployment’s correlation to election results varies the most out of 
the three metrics presented.  It is the true variant among all Census Bureau regions presented in 
this study.  This is notable because this is also the only metric that was attained on the state level 
and not county level due to a dearth of county-level data for historical unemployment.  Also, 
such an observation is notable because it unemployment proved to be statistically insignificant 
during the Kramer 1971 study.  While there have been numerous studies pointing to a 
statistically significant relationship between unemployment rates and electoral outcomes – 
including those cited by Kramer of Rees et al – in both this study and Kramer 1971, this 
relationship is inconsistent at best and statistically insignificant at worst. 
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 While the abstracted conclusions presented above are useful, it is particularly interesting 
to analyze each region independently, looking for patterns and nuance in the data.  A more 
fundamental comparison of regional differences will be presented in Chapter 5.2, but for now it 
is instructive to discuss each region independently.    
West North Central Midwest 
 At the beginning of this study, several justifications were given as to why the West North 
Central Midwest should prove to have a significantly different relationship between economic 
and electoral indicators – and, perhaps more generally, why there should be a regional bias 
associated with this relationship.  These justifications ranged from the demographic to even the 
structure of the regional economy.  This region contains the states of Iowa, Kansas, Minnesota, 
Missouri, Nebraska, North Dakota, and South Dakota as previously discussed.   
 Indeed, after substantial analysis, it is possible to see a regional bias.  However, the 
exceptionality that was expected in the West North Central Midwest is certainly debatable.  
Table 5.1 provides a complete review of the regression analysis performed on this region:  
Table 5.1: Model Coefficients in West North Central Midwest United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.263  ‐1.566  ‐1.195     ‐1.538       (0.562) (0.529) (0.635)     (0.684)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.347        0.199  0.337  0.048    (0.475)       (0.38)  (0.564)  (0.39) 
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  ‐0.113        ‐0.445     ‐0.040  ‐0.429 (0.469)       (0.296)    (0.527)  (0.385)
R2  0.014  0.118  0.558  0.748  0.595  0.119  0.750 
 
Standard errors are also presented in parentheses.  Several observations are clearly evident in this 
table.  First, it should be expected that the unemployment coefficients be negative as there is 
usually an inverse relationship between a positive – or, rising – unemployment rate and election 
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results, with voters shying away from incumbents during periods of high unemployment (Kramer 
1971).  However, in Table 5.1, this is certainly not the case.  In fact, unemployment coefficients 
are positive for all equations.  Also, the statistical significance of this metric should be 
questioned, as its standard error is very high compared to the actual coefficient.  Moreover, there 
seems to be a robust correlation between per capita income and election results in the West North 
Central Midwest as demonstrated in Table 5.1.  Standard error for this coefficient proves to be 
generally less than half of the actual coefficient value.  Puzzlingly, however, the sign seems to be 
incorrect for this metric.  It is expected that there is a positive relationship between per capita 
income and election results – that is, the incumbent benefits if per capita income is rising.  In 
general such a metric is a measure of the effects of a growing economy, which are generally 
positive.  Therefore, a negative coefficient for this metric is of concern. 
 Moreover, the inflation indicator used – average wage over time – actually proves results 
consistent with expectations.  It is expected that this metric would have an inverse relationship, 
actually working to the detriment of an incumbent.  The data presented in Table 5.1 is consistent 
with that – a series of negative coefficients holds true to this relationship.  However, the strength 
of this correlation is very likely statistically insignificant for most models, but especially the 
Equation 4.7 model as standard error is problematically high.  Finally, the dataset’s fit to 
Equation 4.7 is also of importance.  While contemporary research has, at times, placed an all too 
great emphasis on the R2 coefficient of determination, it is instructive to incorporate this value 
into this discussion.  The R2 presented in Table 5.1 is 0.750, which is very solid in terms of the 
dataset’s fit to Equation 4.7.  However, as will be presented in later sections, this R2 actually 
proves to be one of the worst regional fits to data.  Again, an over-abstraction of conclusions 
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from this one simple value should be avoided.  But such a finding is worth some level of 
discussion and note. 
South Atlantic 
 The South Atlantic region includes the states of Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, 
North Carolina, South Carolina, Virginia, and West Virginia.  Similar conclusions can be drawn 
from Table 5.2.  However, there are notable exceptions to this analysis.  As presented below: 
Table 5.2: Model Coefficients in South Atlantic United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.634  ‐1.578  ‐1.664     ‐1.619       (0.374) (0.402) (0.435)     (0.464)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.138        ‐0.094  ‐0.001  ‐0.180    (0.592)       (0.288)  (0.693)  (0.323)
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  0.246        0.128     0.246  0.164 
(0.35)       (0.166)    (0.431)  (0.2) 
R2  0.110  0.013  0.826  0.855  0.832  0.110  0.875 
 
Table 5.2 provides several stark contradictions to the data presented in Table 5.1.  It appears that 
there is a largely negative correlation between incumbency-weighted unemployment and election 
results.  The only exception to this trend appears in the coefficients presented for Equation 4.2, 
which happen to be positive.  Moreover, the statistical significant of unemployment is 
questionable – it is statistically insignificant due to the vastly larger standard error as compared 
to the actual coefficient.  Again, however, incumbency-weighted per capita income proves to 
have the strongest correlation to election results.  While the correlation puzzlingly still remains 
negative, it proves to be a robust correlation between the two datasets.  Finally, incumbency-
weighted average wage actually proves to be positive in Table 5.2 – again, in stark contrast to the 
average wage presented in Table 5.1.  This sign state is puzzling as it indicates that there is a 
positive relationship between an inflation indicator and pro-incumbent election results.  Such an 
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observation is counter-intuitive.  However, it should also be noted that the statistical significance 
of this relationship is small – in the coefficient data presented for Equation 4.7, the relationship 
appears statistically insignificant.    
New England 
 Further continuing the trend of virtually ever region having differing regression 
coefficients, New England proves to be no exception.  The states included in this region are 
Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, Rhode Island, and Vermont.  The data 
presented in Table 5.3 is as follows:  
Table 5.3: Model Coefficients in New England United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.107  ‐1.168  ‐1.071     ‐1.135       (0.15)  (0.192) (0.18)     (0.224)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.323        0.058  0.238  0.076    (0.324)       (0.114)  (0.383)  (0.13) 
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  ‐0.219        0.051     ‐0.157  0.063 (0.227)       (0.084)    (0.266)  (0.098)
R2  0.189  0.199  0.932  0.939  0.937  0.282  0.948 
 
Particularly, in New England, the general trend of incumbency-weighted per capita income 
demonstrating the most robust correlation to election results continues.  Indeed, t-tests for 
significance demonstrate a robust statistically significant relationship for per capita income as 
related to the Democrat’s share of time-series election results in every regression involving this 
metric.   
It seems that virtually every region has a unique set of regressor matrices.  Indeed, it 
should be noted that the average wage coefficients in New England are not entirely positive nor 
are they negative.  These coefficients’ values alternate – in fact, this entire metric is actually 
statistically insignificant for New England.  Table 5.3 does demonstrate, though, that the pattern 
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of average wage holding a relatively weak correlation to the Democrat share of election results 
continues.  This pattern – when coupled with a relatively large standard error per the actual 
values of the regression coefficients – demonstrates a weak correlation for average wage with 
election results in New England.   
Moreover, as in Table 5.1, it appears that the unemployment coefficients in Table 5.3 are 
also positive.  The reasoning behind this phenomenon is unclear.  It appears that standard error is 
quite high for this metric, as well, likely contributing to a puzzling result.  Finally, some attention 
must be given to the strong dataset fit in this region – the coefficient of determination is 0.948, 
indicating a very tight fit to data.  This strong fit will be further evaluated in Chapter 6, when the 
predictive capability of this particular model will be evaluated.   
Middle Atlantic 
 The results for the Middle Atlantic region reflect one of the least accurate regressions 
performed in this study.  It seems that virtually all metrics are significantly inaccurate, and 
standard error is quite high for all regression coefficients.  This region includes New Jersey, New 
York, and Pennsylvania.  This is best demonstrated in Table 5.4:  
Table 5.4: Model Coefficients in Middle Atlantic United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.271  ‐2.029  ‐1.127     ‐1.810       (0.61)  (1.008) (0.685)     (1.332)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.465        0.272  0.452  0.173    (0.444)       (0.39)  (0.471)  (0.464)
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  ‐0.251        0.372     ‐0.239  0.310 (0.318)       (0.392)    (0.322)  (0.494)
R2  0.134  0.216  0.520  0.631  0.588  0.337  0.655 
 
The regression for this region can be best described as a hybrid between the West North Central 
Midwest and New England regions.  The average wage metric oscillates between positive and 
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negative, depending on the regression.  Moreover, unemployment is puzzlingly positive.  Also, 
per capita income – while still a very strong correlation – does not prove to have as strong of a 
correlation as in other regression datasets.  The overarching conclusion after regression in this 
region is that standard error of coefficients is extremely high.  It is difficult to identify any 
concrete statistically significant relationship in this matrix as standard error is often even larger 
than the coefficient values.  This analysis is supported by t-tests for significance, which indicate 
that all three metrics actually have a statistically insignificant relationship to the Democratic 
share of votes in Presidential elections in this region.  This lack of “good fit” of the data to the 
Equation 4.7 model is also supported by a comparatively low R2 value of just 0.655.  Other 
regions in this study have reported coefficients of determination upwards of 0.900.  Regardless 
of the lack of data fit, the overarching trend of per capita income maintaining the strongest 
correlation among the three metrics continued in the Middle Atlantic region.   
East North Central Midwest 
 Per the analysis performed in this study, the East North Central Midwest actually proves 
to have one of the best regressions for Equation 4.7.  The East North Central Midwest contains 
the states of Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin.  This region has the best fit of data 
to the regression and several of the strongest statistically significant relationships between 
economic indicators and the Democrat share of the election vote in Presidential elections. 
 Much of this analysis can be seen in Table 5.5 as follows:  
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Table 5.5: Model Coefficients in East North Central Midwest United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.380  ‐1.182  ‐1.429     ‐1.044       (0.461) (0.238) (0.485)     (0.198)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.080        0.146  ‐0.369  ‐0.169    (0.301)       (0.177)  (0.278)  (0.096)
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  ‐0.473        ‐0.358     ‐0.760  ‐0.504 (0.256)       (0.1)     (0.319)  (0.112)
R2  0.461  0.018  0.691  0.942  0.748  0.661  0.977 
  
What makes this regression set so promising for the modeling done via Equation 4.7 is the 
strength of correlation and the significantly low standard coefficient error reported for each 
metric.  Indeed, when t-tests for significance are performed, per capita income and average wage 
actually yield the strongest correlations – with per capita income holding true to the previously 
discussed patterns of high correlation to election returns.  Indeed, as in virtually all other regions, 
per capita income actually reflects a negative coefficient sign, indicating an inverse relationship 
to election returns.  Average wage also holds a negative sign, consistent with patterns seen in the 
West North Central Midwest, as well.  However, a new pattern that emerges in this analysis is 
that of unemployment having negative values, which was only seen in the South Atlantic.  
Unemployment holds a statistically insignificant correlation in the East North Central Midwest 
and in this instance has a high standard error compared to the actual value of the unemployment 
coefficients.   
 Perhaps the most exciting aspect of this region, however, is the highly “fit” data to the 
model.  Equation 4.7 holds a coefficient of determination of 0.977 – an extremely “fit” dataset to 
the model.  This highly fit data is also presented in Chapter 6’s predictive capability section with 
excellent results.  Indeed, the East North Central Midwest region is perhaps the best 
representation of the relationships that this study seeks to elucidate.  It accurately presents per 
 46
capita income as the strongest driver of electoral outcomes and also presents one of the other two 
metrics as having an effectively auxiliary affect on electoral outcomes.   
East South Central 
 In general, the East South Central region maintains many of the same patterns seen in 
previous regions – namely, those seen in the West North Central Midwest and the South 
Atlantic.  It includes the states of Alabama, Kentucky, Mississippi, and Tennessee.  This 
regression data can be seen in Table 5.6: 
Table 5.6: Model Coefficients in East North Central Midwest United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income [Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.421  ‐1.505  ‐1.461     ‐1.927       (0.467) (0.555) (0.494)     (0.359)
Unemployment [Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     ‐0.148        ‐0.242  ‐0.068  ‐0.729    (0.529)       (0.31)  (0.793)  (0.277)
Average Wage [Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  0.111        ‐0.101     0.082  ‐0.470 (0.348)       (0.23)     (0.524)  (0.193)
R2  0.025  0.019  0.699  0.717  0.750  0.027  0.937 
 
One of the most notable aspects of the East South Central region is that virtually every 
coefficient is negative.  The only exception to this is the average wage value for Equation 4.6.  
This is particularly striking as it goes against the expectations previously outlined – namely, that 
incumbency-weighted per capita income coefficients should be positive and incumbency-
weighted unemployment and average wage coefficients should establish an inverse relationship 
with the Democrat share of election returns with negative regression coefficients.   
 Once again, per capita income provides a robust, statistically significant relationship 
between it and the Democrat share of election returns.  This claim is further supported by 
statistically significant t-test for significance values.  However, it appears that unemployment 
and do not provide as robust of an independent correlation to election returns.  These two 
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metrics’ standard error of coefficients still remains relatively high, although not as overbearing 
as in other regions.  Finally, there appears to be a strong fit of this data to the model presented 
per Equation 4.7 – the coefficient of determination is above 0.90, indicating a good fit.  
West South Central 
 The West South Central region is exceptional in that it provides one of the most 
persuasive arguments in support of per capita income as the leading economic indicator for 
electoral outcomes.  This region includes the states of Arkansas, Louisiana, Oklahoma, and 
Texas.  This region has a strong fit of data to the model and actually has given results that are 
generally consistent with expectations.  Table 5.7 presents the regression data supporting such 
claims: 
Table 5.7: Model Coefficients in West South Central  United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐2.590  ‐2.507  ‐2.496     ‐2.489       (0.398) (0.394) (0.275)     (0.337)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.583        0.374  0.415  0.350    (0.725)       (0.158)  (1.045)  (0.241)
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  ‐0.459        ‐0.220     ‐0.238  ‐0.035 (0.640)       (0.198)    (0.909)  (0.211)
R2  0.114  0.139  0.914  0.939  0.970  0.158  0.970 
 
First, per capita income’s linear coefficients in this model are incredibly robust.  A coefficient of 
greater than 2.0 with such a low standard coefficient error is exceptional for this study.  While 
the per capita income coefficients still remain negative – a common, yet puzzling, seen 
throughout the regressions performed in this study – it is this robust relationship that is especially 
promising.  Statistical evidence also supports the robust relationship between per capita income 
and electoral outcomes, with a vast statistically significant relationship demonstrated through t-
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tests for significance.  Indeed, per capita income is the chief driver of the Democrat’s share of 
votes for this region, in this study. 
 The other two metrics provide results similar to previously discussed regions.  Again, 
unemployment coefficients are positive – an observation that is contrary to expectations.  
However, standard error for this metric is generally lower than in previous regions (barring the 
extraneous results seen for the unemployment coefficient for Equation 4.6 in this region).  Also, 
the average wage coefficients appear to follow expectations – they have negative values and hold 
a relatively smaller level of correlation compared to per capita income.   
These observations are very much consistent with results seen in previously discussed 
regions – that is, per capita income has the strongest correlation, average wage is a consistently 
weak force, and that unemployment coefficients have a variable effect.  Moreover, what is 
particularly interesting and indicative of the strong level of “fit” for this data to the model is the 
extremely high coefficient of determination value.  As seen in the East North Central Midwest 
region, the R2 value is extremely high at 0.970 for the West South Central region.  Not only is 
this promising relating to the predictive capability for this model in this particular region, but it is 
also doubly indicative of the earlier claims made in support of per capita income as a strong 
driving force for electoral results in this region.  
Pacific 
 The Pacific region of the United States seems to provide data that runs slightly contrary 
to that of previously presented regions.  This region includes the states of Alaska, California, 
Hawaii, Oregon, and Washington.  Indeed, several maxims outlined in this chapter are still 
consistent – per capita income still maintains the greatest impact on electoral outcomes in this 
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region.  However, the robustness of all economic metrics to electoral outcomes in this region is 
debatable.  The regression analysis can be illustrated through Table 5.8:  
Table 5.8: Model Coefficients in Pacific United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.185  ‐0.663  ‐1.106     ‐0.601       (0.72)  (0.928) (0.516)     (0.539)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.762        0.714  0.720  0.707    (0.447)       (0.325)  (0.279)  (0.269)
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  0.255        0.173     0.242  0.168 (0.139)       (0.187)    (0.090)  (0.109)
R2  0.456  0.421  0.403  0.535  0.771  0.831  0.895 
 
While the data in this region fits the regression well – the coefficient of determination is 
relatively high at 0.895 – standard error of coefficients for per capita income and average wage is 
very high relative to the coefficient values.  For example, average wage has all positive values – 
again, contrary to the expected relationship that average wage, an inflation indicator, should hold 
to electoral outcomes – but has very high standard error.  Its standard error is even higher than 
the coefficient values for several regressions.  This relationship is not statistically significant.   
 Similarly, unlike other regions, the relationship between per capita income and 
Democrat’s share of the election results is actually not statistically significant in this instance.  
Standard error is incredibly high – at levels not seen in any other region.  Yet it is still negative, 
as seen in all other regions despite an apparent anomaly in all other relationships.  What is 
particularly concerning is the low coefficient present for per capita income in Equation 4.7 – this 
study’s chief model.  Finally, it appears that unemployment actually holds the strongest 
correlation to electoral outcomes in the Pacific region.  The relative ratio of the regression 
coefficients to their standard error is low, compared to the rest of the data presented in Table 5.8.   
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 Indeed, it appears that while the data “fits” the models presented in Table 5.8 relatively 
well, the conclusions that can be drawn from the Pacific region are limited.  All analysis points 
to these regressions for this region to be an anomaly, as the overarching conclusions that are very 
much applicable to other regions are simply not as robust – or not even statistically significant – 
in the Pacific region.  The data’s fit to this model is effectively irrelevant.  The economic 
metrics’ correlation to electoral outcomes is simply not statistically significant – and therefore, 
can be interpreted as ineffective drivers of electoral outcomes – in this region.  Perhaps the most 
useful aspect of this analysis, however, is the clear evidence for a geographical bias in the effects 
of the set of correlations this study seeks to analyze.  Regions such as the East North Central 
Midwest – as demonstrated in Table 5.5 – can have significant and robust correlations, while the 
Pacific region can have a dearth of virtually all identified relationships.  The novelty of a 
regional analysis allows one to actually parse conclusions to a geographical level, rather than 
simply generalizing such an abstract relationship to the entire country – the latter was the nature 
of analysis performed by Kramer 1971, a generalized conclusion and model applied to the entire 
United States.   
Mountain 
 While the Mountain region of the United States has data that very strongly fits to its 
Equation 4.7 model, there are a number of observations which are actually quite different in this 
region compared to other regions of the United States.  The regression matrix that was used can 
provide significant context through Table 5.9:  
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Table 5.9: Model Coefficients in Mountain United States Region 
   (4.1)  (4.2)  (4.3)  (4.4)  (4.5)  (4.6)  (4.7) 
Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1]        ‐1.113  ‐1.076  ‐1.490     ‐1.480       (0.97)  (1.114) (0.345)     (0.424)
Unemployment δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1]     0.746        0.885  0.732  0.881    (0.369)       (0.162)  (0.422)  (0.199)
Average Wage δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1]  0.083        0.059     0.053  0.013 (0.207)       (0.21)     (0.17)  (0.079)
R2  0.039  0.505  0.248  0.267  0.931  0.521  0.932 
 
Indeed, the per capita income figures maintain the same negative sign seen throughout this 
metric in previous analyses in this study.  However, what is particularly interesting is the high 
rate of standard error in this metric.  In fact, when all three economic metrics are regressed per 
Equation 4.7, per capita income actually has a statistically insignificant correlation to the 
Democratic share of election returns in Presidential elections.  The metric that has been the 
strongest indicator of electoral outcomes for all other regions in this study – per capita income – 
actually proves to not be statistically significant factor for Equation 4.7.  However, when average 
wage is removed as a factor, per Equation 4.5, per capita income’s statistical significance returns.  
It appears that average wage is so grossly insignificant of a factor in this regression, that it 
actually distorts the regression to a very high degree such that per capita income becomes 
statistically insignificant per t-tests for significance.   
 Another notable deviation from the norms presented thus far in this study is that 
unemployment actually appears to have a strong statistical significance for Equation 4.7 in the 
Mountain region.  During the 4.7 regression for the Mountain region, it is, in fact, the only 
statistically significant factor affecting the Democratic share of Presidential elections.  
Furthermore, a particularly puzzling deviation from other regions is that both average wage and 
unemployment coefficients are positive in this region’s regressions – a state that is not seen in 
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any other region.  Both factors should hold inverse relationships – that is, be negative – to 
election returns, as they are incumbency-weighted.  Because this does not hold true, it is a 
particularly strange deviation.   
 The Mountain region actually demonstrates one of the best dataset “fit” to the models out 
of all regions studied.  The coefficient of determination is 0.932, indicating an excellent fit of 
data.  However, the several strange deviations from all other regions studied makes this 
regression set particularly interesting.  Finally, while per capita income solely in this region does 
not prove to have the most significant impact on electoral outcomes, it is still a major factor 
affecting the Democrat share of election results.  The statistically insignificant results found in 
the Equation 4.7 regression for per capita income is truly an anomaly caused by a major 
deviation in average wage.  This level of data skewing is further discussed in Chapter 5, when 
increased measurement of data as a method for increasing accuracy is evaluated.   
 (5.2) Evidence for a Regional Difference 
 While the strength of correlation between the three economic indicators studied and 
actual election results is questionable – and will be discussed at length in the subsequent section 
– it is clear that there appears to be a strong difference in strength of correlation among various 
geographic regions of the United States.  Effectively, it is clear that there is a geographical and 
regional difference in how economic metrics are related to election results.   
The results given in various regions of the United States – for example, the East North 
Central Midwest compared to the Mountain region – is marked.  As demonstrated in Tables 5.5 
and 5.9, there is a clear difference in the coefficients found after regression.   
Indeed, Table 5.5 can be compared to Table 5.9, which represents the Mountain region.  
Table 5.9 certainly has several striking differences.  First, all of the average wage coefficients are 
 53
positive in Table 5.9 versus negative in the previous table.  This is likely due to a number of 
reasons – including statistical externalities that were not accounted for in this relatively limited 
statistical model.  However, such a marked difference in coefficients for particularly distinct 
regions is striking.  It should be noted that similarities are also evident.  It seems that per capita 
income serves as an inverse correlation for both regions – much more strongly related in the East 
North Central Midwest than in the Mountain region.   
 It should be absolutely recognized that there are still significant issues with the strength 
of correlation as presented in Tables 5.5 and 5.9.  Namely, the standard error for each coefficient 
is arguably high in virtually every unit of data presented.  However, even with this error the 
significant variation between these two regions does provide even evidence to support some 
significant level of a regional variation in this relationship.  There are fundamental differences in 
the strength of correlation between these two regions  
 (5.3) Strength of Correlation 
 From the results presented in Chapter 4.1, it is absolutely clear that of the three economic 
indicators studied – average wage as an inflation indicator, per capita income, and 
unemployment rate – per capita income has the strongest correlation to the Democrat share of the 
general election results in Presidential elections.  The other two indicators have demonstrated 
statistical significance in certain instances and particular regions.  However, per capita income 
has been a robust indicator, demonstrating statistical significance in all regions except the 
Mountain region. (The latter case was also resolved by simply reevaluating statistical 
significance after removing the errant results of average wage from the regression.  Effectively, 
this aberration was caused by another indicator distorting the results.)  
 54
 The correlation of average wage and unemployment rate is very much debatable.  Several 
t-tests for significance indicate that unemployment rate held very little statistical significance – 
or correlation to election results – for all regions except the Mountain region.  These results are 
also reflective of the results presented in Kramer 1971 – unemployment simply was not a robust 
factor and was, in fact, statistically insignificant.   
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6. Data Verification  
The integrity of data used for analysis is a problem that plagues virtually all forms of 
quantitative analysis.  Departments across the bureaucratic spectrum – local, county, state, and 
federal – present a myriad of statistics that are calculated and measured inconsistently.  The 
purpose of this chapter is to address such inconsistencies in analysis, demonstrate the integrity of 
the data presented, and illustrate steps taken to increase robustness of analysis. 
(6.1) Increased Measureable Variables Increases Accuracy 
 A considerable amount of thought was given to the original model as presented in the 
fourth chapter of this analysis.  While intentional consideration was given to remaining true to 
Kramer’s original model for comparative consistency, several variations that were added actually 
increase this analysis’ robustness.  A greater number of measureable factors did marginally 
correlate to increased accuracy of analysis (Ansolabehere 2008).  Because several additional 
factors – namely, the proxy indicator for local inflation given through average wage – have been 
added to this analysis, further accuracy is expected. 
Indeed, it is possible to see that multiple survey items do, in fact, generally decrease 
measurement error – especially over the medium-term time period indicated in this study.  
However, the important caveat to this framework is that in many instances – especially in the 
models presented in this study – measurement error has actually increased.  That is, a t-test of 
statistical significance has actually demonstrated a worse regression fit to the data with an 
increasing number of measurement variables.  For example, the t-values are actually negatively 
affected in Table 6.1 actually decreases observed t-values when adding average wage: 
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Table 6.1: Regression Coefficients and T‐Values in Mountain Region 
   Per Capita Income δ[Io‐I‐1)/I‐1] 
Unemployment 
δ[Uo‐U‐1)/U‐1] 
Average Wage 
δ[Wo‐W‐1)/W‐1] 
Equation 
(4.6) 
‐1.490  0.885    
(0.345)  (0.162)    
tobs‐tcrit (4.6)  1.133  2.284    
Equation 
(4.7) 
‐1.480  0.881  0.013 
(0.424)  (0.199)  (0.079) 
tobs‐tcrit (4.7)  ‐0.815  0.132  ‐4.132 
 
Certainly, Table 6.1 illustrates that adding average wage in this specific example actually 
decreases the tobs-tcrit  (when this value is positive, the correlation of economic indicator to 
Democrat share of the election results is statistically significant; when negative, this relationship 
is statistically insignificant) of per capita income such that it becomes negative.  Therefore, per 
capita income actually becomes statistically insignificant due to the extraneous effects of adding 
average wage as an indicator.  The major conclusion that is drawn from Table 6.1 is that adding 
multiple variables of measurement does not necessarily increase the accuracy of results.  In this 
instance, adding the relatively erroneous average wage factor – it should be noted that it is 
erroneous only for this region largely due to the very high relative standard coefficient error of 
0.079, which is larger than the coefficient value of 0.013 – actually makes per capita income 
insignificant.  Without a step-wise analysis comparing the correlation and statistical significance 
of all variables to each other and to the dependent variable, this relationship – and the negative 
externality that average wage creates, by making per capita income insignificant in Equation 4.7 
– would not have been isolated.  Not only is Table 6.1 indicative of the caution that should be 
taken in including extra variables of measurement, but it also instructive regarding statistical 
analysis. 
 57
 It should be noted that this phenomenon is generally the exception in this study, but is 
mentioned due to its overall importance for quantitative analysis – usually a greater number of 
measurement variables can actually increase the reliability of a model, barring extraneous 
effects.  For this study, the situation illustrated in Table 6.1 only occurred once – in the Mountain 
region.   
(6.2) Fundamental Problems in Statistical Research – Competing Levels of Data 
 While political scientists will often be among the first to argue that government agency 
data can be misleading at times, it is often the only data available for analysis.  This data is 
measured through a number of possible scenarios – calculated, survey, or a hybrid.  Generally, 
survey data is perhaps the most robust form of material that can be analyzed.  However, often 
state agencies will simply calculate statistics on demographics, economic indicators, and other 
reportable statistics.  Such competing measurements directly force researchers to question 
whether their data is valid.  The difficulty in assessing local data’s authenticity lies in whether it 
is calculated or surveyed.  The purpose of this section is to compare and contrast the integrity of 
the various sources of data presented in Section 3 utilizing variance analysis to demonstrate the 
wide range of conclusions and extrapolations that would be possible given competing forms of 
data. 
(6.3) How to Analyze Particulate Data – A Problem of Parsing Data 
 One of the difficulties – and really a major weakness – of this study has been the 
transformation of particulate, county-level data into broader regional abstractions.  As outlined in 
Chapter 4, the methodology for this study was to utilize county-level data for average wage and 
per capita income, coupled with state-level unemployment rates – all to provide regional 
generalizations about how these economic indicators relate to the Democrat share of Presidential 
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elections on a county-level basis.  It is evident that some level of abstraction must be performed 
in order to transform this data into broader regional conclusions.  The methodology chosen for 
this goal was to effectively average each county-level economic indicator by region.  The 
inherent problem with this methodology is that all counties are effectively treated as the same, 
regardless of size.  When federal agencies calculate average wage, per capita income, and 
unemployment rates, it is done by considering entire population totals – this was not performed 
in this study, and is a concern that is well taken. 
 However, this preceding discussion is one that is central to any researcher wanting to 
utilize local-level data in order to make broader assertions.  Is the method previously discussed 
effective?  The answer to this question is debatable.  Per the discussion in Chapter 6, the models 
that were created in this study were fairly robust.  That is not to say that they cannot be 
improved, but it is clear that on some fundamental level, the methodology performed in this 
study did perform well.   
  In social science research, there are those investigators who are effectively parsers and 
those who are aggregators – that is, those who believe that local, particulate data is a more 
effective level of analysis and those that believe that aggregating data proves to be much more 
effective.  For the course of this study, had the particulate data been kept in county-level form, it 
would have been virtually impossible to perform enough regressions to accurately obtain any 
evidence of geographical biases or differences among various regions of the United States.   
 The alternative to this study’s chosen method of analysis is a simple analysis of broader 
regional statistics.  There is an availability of Census-defined regional data regarding average 
wage, election returns, per capita income, and even unemployment data.  Such a method of 
analysis is perfectly valid and may even prove to be more accurate in some respects.  However, it 
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was not chosen as the universe of data for this study as a more local-centric approach was 
desired.    
(6.4) Data Availability – Historical, Time-Series Local Data is Absent 
 One of the greatest challenges of this study has been simply obtaining accurate, local 
data.  For recent analysis – 1990s and onwards – obtaining parsed, local historical data is 
relatively easy.  Several United States federal agencies make such data readily available.  
However, considering time-series data prior to 1990 on a county level becomes more 
problematic.  County-level data from the 1970s is simply not available in certain cases – hence 
the major structural changes that this study performed to Kramer’s model.  Local metrics and 
robust substitutes for inflation, for example, were not recorded on a county-level basis prior to 
approximately 1990.  Therefore, this study substituted one of the few inflation-resembling 
metrics that have been available on a county-level, time-series basis – average wage. 
 One of the more surprising aspects of the dearth of local, county-level data was the lack 
of reliable county-level unemployment rates prior to 1990.  Agencies such as the Bureau of 
Labor Statistics and the Bureau of Economic Analysis simply did not go below the universe of 
state and major metropolitan area data during the 1970s and 1980s for employment (and 
unemployment figures).  Therefore, this study attempted to use the next best thing – state-level 
data. 
 This discussion – and in a way, this study overall – illustrates an issue that many social 
science researchers are facing: a problem of data tradeoffs.  It would be perfectly logical for this 
study to simply use data from 1990-2000 in its regression analysis, as this was the local data 
available for all three economic metrics.  However, such an analysis represented a tradeoff that 
seemed unreasonable to make – a sacrifice of the robustness of the generated regressions and 
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models for the sake of simply preserving an entirely “local” dataset of economic indicators.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 7, the predictive capability of the generated models is actually quite 
robust – it is because a large swath of 20 years was able to be evaluated, rather than only two 
election cycles as otherwise would have been possible.   
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7. Predictive Capability 
(7.1) Historical Versus Predicted Election Results – Model Efficacy 
Given the regional differences discussed in Chapter 5 and the meaningful conclusions 
that were able to be drawn from the regressions performed per Equation 4.7, it is imperative to 
test the robustness of this model’s predictive capability.  Because significantly different 
coefficients were found for each region, predictive scores have been performed on a regional 
basis compared to the actual election data that helped construct the models.  The predictive 
capability of Equation 4.7 using the coefficients and economic data found in the West North 
Central Midwest is illustrated in Figure 7.1:  
Figure 7.1: Predictive Capability in the West North Central Midwest Region
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On a simple visual analysis, it is clear that actual Presidential Democratic vote shares are 
generally in line with this model.  The two major exceptions are the 1984 election – in which 
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Democrats outperformed considerably from 1980 – and the 1992 election.  The most egregious 
error in this figure comes during the 1988 election, when the model vastly overestimates the 
downward trend in the Democratic share of the vote.   
 However, again a regional difference among these models emerges.  As demonstrated in 
Figure 7.2, there is a much tighter correlation between predicted election returns and actual 
historical values for the West South Central region as compared to the West North Central 
Midwest region: 
Figure 7.2: Predictive Capability in the West South Central Region
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It is clear that this region has a significantly better representation of model fit than that of Figure 
7.1.  Once again, the strength of correlation – and therefore, these models’ predictive power – 
seems to have a strong geographic bias or difference.   
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 Indeed, the strength of the predictive capability of this model can also be demonstrated 
through Figures 7.3 and 7.4, which illustrate the very tight linear fit of predicted annual election 
results to actual historical values in the New England and Mountain regions, respectively: 
Figure 7.3: Predictive Capability in the New England Region
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Figure 7.4: Predictive Capability in the Mountain Region
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 (7.2) A Discussion of Dataset Best Fit 
 Interestingly, it appears that several southern regions data actually fits its regression 
exceptionally well.  In general, the two southern Census regions have data that fits their 
regressions better than other regions of the United States per the coefficient of determination.  
Two of the three best “fitting” regions are the East South Central and West South Central 
regions.  The other regions with the best coefficients of determination are New England, East 
North Central Midwest, and the Mountain regions. 
 However, dataset best fit – simply the coefficient of determination being as close to 1.000 
as possible – is not a fully accurate indicator of how well the regressions presented in this study 
actually establish correlation between economic indicators and election results.  While this is a 
point that was mentioned in passing throughout Chapter 5.1, it is a point that deserves to be 
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underscored.  Several of the regressions presented in this study have had superb R2 values – 
0.970, and 0.948 for the West South Central and New England regions, respectively.  As 
demonstrated in Chapter 7.1, several of these regions do hold a tremendously close relationship 
in their predicted values to actual election results.  However, regions such as the East North 
Central Midwest region – with the best R2 of all regions of 0.977, still indicating excellent fit – 
fails to accurately predict election results.   
Figure 7.5: Predictive Capability in the East North Central Midwest Region
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As demonstrated in Figure 7.5, it has a relatively poor predictive capability compared to Figures 
7.1-7.4 – this is due to the lack of statistical significance in correlation between the economic 
indicators and electoral results.  This case is a prime example of how an over-reliance on 
coefficients of determination should not be used in analysis.  Data simply fitting a model well is 
an exceptionally poor indicator of predictive capacity.   
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 Indeed, Figure 7.2 is an excellent example of how even a relatively poorer “fitting” 
dataset can actually produce a significantly more robust model.  The West North Central 
Midwest region, as modeled by Figure 7.2, has an R2 of only 0.750 as compared to the high 
value of the Mountain region at 0.977.  However, Figure 7.2 much more accurately models the 
correlations between per capita income, unemployment, and average wage to electoral outcomes 
than the relationship demonstrated in Figure 7.5.  
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8. Summary of Major Findings 
Several important conclusions can be drawn from the data and analysis presented in this 
study.  Not only did this study present a novel method of analysis – the introduction of a local 
universe of analysis and regional variation in Kramer’s 1971 model – but it also has worked to 
establish a rigorous framework for analysis of local economic and electoral data. 
The first topic that this study sought to analyze was the relationship between economic 
indicators and electoral outcomes.  The three independent variables studied were the economic 
indicators of county-level average wage, county-level per capita income, and state-level 
unemployment rate.  Of these three economic indicators, per capita income held the strongest 
correlation to the county-level share of the Presidential vote that incumbency-weighted 
Democrat candidates received.  Per capita income proved to have a robust correlation to 
incumbency-weighted electoral results in virtually all regions. 
The second topic of study was the degree of regional difference between economic 
indicators and electoral outcomes in the United States.  Per the results presented in Chapter 5, it 
appears that there is a significant regional variation among the various Census Bureau defined 
regions in the United States.  While per capita income had a statistically significant relationship 
to electoral outcomes in virtually all regions, average wage and unemployment’s significance to 
election returns varied widely across regions.  Moreover, the predictive capacity – a reflection of 
the robustness of regression, and therefore a reflection of the relationship between the chosen 
economic indicators and election returns – varied significantly depending on region.  There, in 
fact, was a regional difference in this analysis.  Figures 7.2 through 7.4 – all with excellent 
predictive capacities – can be compared to Figure 7.5 to clearly demonstrate this difference in 
correlation across regions. 
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However, it is important to not take these findings out of context.  This study studied the 
relationship between local economic conditions and election results almost in isolation.  With the 
exception of an incumbency weight, demographics and party affiliation were not really 
considered.  These factors were considered as implicit in the regional differences among the 
various regions of the United States as discussed in Chapters 1 and 4.  Some of the non-measured 
factors were also slightly mitigated by using a year-over-year percentage change methodology 
for all indicators.  Therefore, factors that were changing each year were studied.  Regardless, this 
model should not be considered a definitive study of the relationship between economics and 
politics.  It can certainly be expanded upon – several suggestions are provided in Chapter 9. 
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9. Recommendations for Future Research 
 As partially addressed in previous chapters, there are several aspects of this study that can 
– and should – be further expanded upon or corrected by future researchers.  First, the statistical 
methodology of this study particularly lends itself to improvement.  This study uses relatively 
straightforward regression statistics in order to establish correlations between economic 
indicators and electoral outcomes.  This is a process that can be vastly improved with a greater 
use of more sophisticated statistical models.  The model presented in this study could be 
significantly improved by simply adding more indicators or performing regression in a different 
manner.  Correlation in this study was tested using t-tests for significance.  Various other 
statistical measures for testing correlation exist and could possibly improve the results obtained 
in this study. 
 On a more fundamental level, future methods for abstracting particulate data should also 
be developed.  One of the difficulties of this study, as discussed in Chapter 6, was abstracting 
local data onto a regional level while minimizing the introduction of major systemic error.  
Essentially, when indicators are not measured well, attenuation in correlation occurs.  While 
several sets of correlation have been established in this study – the results in Chapter 5 clearly 
demonstrate this – perhaps these correlations can prove to be more robust if more effective 
methods of abstraction are used.  Certainly, error was introduced in this study, as is the case in 
virtually all studies – it is impossible to abstract such a large dataset onto a regional level and 
perform regression analysis without doing introducing some error.  However, great care and 
many trials with varying universe of data were performed in order to maintain the integrity of 
this study.  Regardless, the future development of methods to successfully abstract local data 
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while minimizing systemic error would greatly enhance the context and validity of correlations 
presented.   
 Moreover, one of the most enjoyable aspects of performing such analysis was modeling 
this method of analysis from Kramer 1971.  Several formative political scientists have furthered 
his analysis – each investigator adding his or her unique twist to the method of analysis – since 
the early 1970s.  In fact, the latest study involving this line of research actually occurred as late 
as 2006.  The fundamental refinement of this almost four-decade old model represents an 
evolution of knowledge – an evolution of how far political science has come from the simple 
level of qualitative analysis to something more rigorous.  Kramer’s work has inspired many 
political science researchers in subsequent years since the publication of his 1971 work.  
However, the pursuit has remained the same – an attempt to apply a quantitative, rigorous 
framework to the relationship between economics and politics.  Future studies with a greater 
number of economic indicators, regional, social, and demographical trends must be performed in 
order to maintain progress within this line of study.  Not only is this information useful on a 
practical level – understanding electoral outcomes given temporal changes in the economy is 
absolutely useful for those attempting to project the effects of economic changes – but it is also 
imperative on a essential level of why voters vote for the leaders that they do.  Our society is 
predicated upon the promise that individual voters can exercise their rights to create fundamental 
change every four years – if anything, further research is required to simply expand our 
knowledge on this basic fact. 
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10. Conclusion 
 Over the course of this study, a repeated emphasis on methodology, regional biases, and 
the importance of quantitative analysis has been stated.  While certainly there are several 
significant externalities that must be accounted for, it is absolutely clear that there is a local 
correlation between economic indicators and electoral outcomes and there is also significant 
regional variation among various areas of the United States when evaluating this correlation.  
Such an assertion is significant due to the quantitative research performed on this subject to date 
– simply, prior to this study there has been a dearth of research on regional variability and local 
analysis when evaluating economic and political relationships.   
 It is also imperative to note that there are significant correlation differences present 
among the three economic indicators evaluated – the data analysis performed in this study 
indicates that per capita income has the most robust correlation to electoral outcomes.  Much as 
Kramer was able to demonstrate in his 1971 study, per capita income proves to have the 
strongest driver of electoral outcomes in this model – especially on a regional basis.  In eight of 
the nine evaluated regions, per capita income had the strongest statistically significant correlation 
to the Democratic share of the Presidential vote in the time-series data used.  Per this same 
analysis, the unemployment rate held the least amount of statistically correlative significance, 
and the average wage indicator studied varied from region to region.   
 One of the strengths that regression analysis provides is an ability to have some sense of 
prospective, predictive capability.  The analysis presented in this study clearly demonstrates that 
the models developed do, in fact, prove to have some level of accurate predictive power – the 
comparison of historical election results to predicted results outlines this relationship clearly.  
However, as with any quantitative study, the assumptions underlying this model must be clearly 
 72
recognized.  Moreover, in order for any concrete predictive power to hold true, advanced 
statistics must be used to strengthen the models presented in this study.  Clearly, several other 
indicators, measurements, and statistics can at one day be applied to this model to increase the 
accuracy of predictions.   
 More generally, a major implicit conclusion of this study relates to the overarching initial 
sentiment addressed in the introduction of this presentation – broad voter choice.  A driving 
principle of this study – as many in the political science research realm – was to better 
understand broad voter choice in elections.  Essentially, this study hoped to shed some light on 
the question of why voters vote the way the do.  What is absolutely clear after the analysis 
performed is that there is some level of rationale behind how voters make choices for an 
economically motivated voter.  The introduction of incumbency – and the strong predictive 
power of voters voting against incumbents when economic downturns occur – robustly supports 
this point.  This sentiment, coupled with the more specific regional conclusions that were 
identified, actually provide a significant framework for future analysis. 
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Appendix A 
The following sources were used for primary data as presented in this study: 
Average wage: Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce, Local 
Area Personal Income. 
Per capita income: Bureau of Economic Analysis, United States Department of Commerce, 
Local Area Personal Income. 
Unemployment rate: Bureau of Labor Statistics, United States Department of Labor, Local Area 
Unemployment Statistics. 
Election results: CenStats – USA Counties, United States Census Bureau 
